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It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the Integrated Logistic
Support program and the Aircraft modification process of the F-4 aircraft.
Data collected from the F-4 Logistic Support Manager's records showed
variances from planned change process as well as engineering and funding
problems. These data pointed to the need for a restructured change
process that provides for a complete Maintenance Engineering Analysis,
improved funding control by the Logistic Manager and specific logistic
decision points throughout the process. Areas for further detailed studies
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) has left its infancy and has become
an important link in the management of today's Naval Weapon Systems.
As a supply officer involved in aviation supply support for several years,
the author has developed a personal interest in the ILS program espe-
cially as it relates to aircraft modifications.
If one looks at the official correspondence relating to aircraft
modifications, it is immediately apparent that a number of problems
exist and recur with startling regularity. Continually seeing these
problems the reasonable man begins to hypothesize that there is some-
thing wrong with the way the aircraft modification programs are managed.
With this hypothesis in mind it was decided that a study of the change
process and how it relates to the integrated logistic support program
would be an effective means of determining what real problems exist
and what could be done about them. The objectives of the study were
two fold, first to gain a good knowledge of the details of the aircraft
modification process, how it is managed and how it relates to ongoing
ILS programs and secondly, from information gathered in the study to
be able to make recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of
the change process.

B. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY
Based on the thesis that there are problems within the change
system, a research effort was designed to identify and substantiate
these problems. This would permit gathering of data which could show
basic reasons for the problems and allow recommendations for their
solution.
The research began with a review of current literature on ILS and
changes. It was almost immediately discovered that while there has
been much writing and research done about the field of ILS, there is no
mention of modifications outside of the basic Navy directives pertaining
to the subject. The information on ILS, however provided many details
that related to the change process.
A series of personal and telephonic interviews were then conducted
with people involved in the ILS and modification programs. These people
who were involved at various points in the change process included per-
sonnel at the Aviation Supply Office, Commander Naval Air Pacific
(CNAP) Headquarters, Naval Air Systems Command Representative
Pacific (NAVAIRSYSCOMREPAC), the F-4 Weapon System Managers
Office, the S-3 Assistant Program Manager for logistic office, the S-3
contractor, Lockheed and Navy Plant Representative Office, Burbank,
California, and Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters.
As a result of the interviews, numerous areas for investigation
were reviewed and the scope of the thesis was narrowed to one aircraft,

the F-4. The choice of aircraft for study was based on availability of
data from the F-4 weapon system manager (WSM) and the author's work-
ing relationship with the F-4 WSM personnel from a previous tour at
the Aviation Supply Office where he was in charge of F-4 supply support.
The data to show agreement with or variance from the change pro-
cess was to come from files maintained by the F-4 Logistic Manager on
each Engineering Change proposal. The specific items for review and
data collection were a series of forms completed as a result of the change
approval which showed planned milestones for the change installation
and approved funds for the change. These summaries were submitted
annually for funding approval, so it was anticipated that a history of
the change showing whether it was meeting planned milestones could
be ascertained. The forms to be reviewed were:
CCB Change Request NAVAIR Form 13050/2
ECP Milestone Chart NAVAIR Form 13051/5
ECP Cost and Funding Summary NAVAIR Form 13051/4.
In addition to these the McDonnell Douglas Report P.S. 408: USN F-4
Composite ILS ECP Status provided information on planned time
schedules for support elements.
Changes for review were to be selected at random from the approxi-
mately 1000 F-4 changes. This was to be accomplished by drawing a
random number representing each change. However, after the first
selection of 10 changes it was found that the data in these change files
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was inadequate for study. Further investigation found that change files
prior to 1972 when the WSM moved to North Island had not been fully
maintained and that active files subsequent to this time had better data.
Additional changes were then selected, seeking files that had adequate
data for review. Two changes which required fund reprogramming
were specifically selected for reviewing their impact on the change
process.
Several limitations on the study are recognized. First the amount
of data with which to work was limited since funding was available for
only one short trip to collect data. Second, the data from the Logistic
Manager's files was incomplete. This lack of data made it necessary
to vary from a random selection of files for review. However, even
without total random selection, discussions with LM personnel indicated
that the changes selected for examination in this thesis were representa-
tive of the change situation on the F-4.
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The next two chapters were designed to synthesize information
gathered from the literature search and the numerous interviews
conducted. Chapter II is a review of the ILS program and definition
of the change process as defined inappropriate directives. Chapter III
delineates the major problems that became apparent in this early
research effort and points out their possible impact on various areas
11

of the change process. The last two chapters display the data collected
showing what is actually happening as opposed to what was planned, an




II. ILS AND CHANGES
A. ILS BACKGROUND
In the 1950's DOD recognized that there was a need to streamline
the procurement process. This resulted in the development of central-
ized program management as opposed to task oriented management.
This concept served as a vehicle to integrate the contributions of a
number of technical specialties including logistic support in the per-
formance of a common project. Over a period of time, increased
recognition of this type of management as the key to optimal weapon
system development has led to additional responsibility accruing to
the project manager and his staff, and the concept of project manage-
ment has now become standard in the field of aircraft acquisition.
Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) being a major part of project
management has also received increasingly more attention and has
been recognized as a key factor in the weapon system acquisition
process. It is defined as a composite of all the support considerations
necessary to assure the effective and economical support of systems/
equipment / for their life cycle and is characterized by harmony and
coherence among all the logistic elements, those elements being:










Logistic Support Resource funds
Logistic support management information.
ILS, then, is a management function that provides controls to
help assure that the ultimate consumer will receive a system that will
not only meet performance requirements, but one which can be expe-
ditiously and economically supported throughout its programmed life
2
cycle. Early in the weapon system development phases, logistic
studies are done, tradeoff factors identified, and trade-offs made
which will define the logistic parameters of the weapon system and
serve as the basis for all future logistic support. The ultimate results
of these decisions are communicated to those participating in the acquisi-
tion process through the Integrated Logistic Support Plan (ILSP). This
document contains milestones, delivery points, names and responsi-
bilities of persons accountable for each support element, guidance on
2





the logistic system desired, interdependences among personnel, as
well as the monitoring and communications system for passing informa-
tion among the participants. The responsibility for implementation of
the plan and monitoring its progress is assigned to a Logistics Manager
(LM) who heads up the weapon's logistic support organization and who
is responsible to the project manager.
B. THE CHANGE PROCESS
Once a sophisticated aircraft weapon system is introduced into
the fleet it begins to undergo a series of changes. The need for these
changes is the result of several factors. Primary among these is long
range planning for aircraft improvement which entails upgrading instal-
led equipment to new technology, correcting deficiencies in design and
improving maintenance capabilities. Unexpected failures such as
structural failure or problems arising from installation of the changes
themselves can also be problem areas.
These changes are implemented through the Technical Directive
(TD) system. NAVAIR INST 5215. 8A establishes the TD system with
the technical directive being the instrument that authorizes installation
of the change and provides direction for the installation and related
maintenance functions.
A flow diagram of the change process is shown in figure 1. This
diagram was compiled from information obtained from the F-4 logistic
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two years before change approval in order for funding requirements
to meet deadlines for inclusion in the Congressional budgeting process.
Early engineering analysis is accomplished during the Engineering
Change Proposal (ECP) preparation. The completed ECP is then
submitted to the WSM who makes final funding and logistical analyses
before sending the ECP to NAVAIR and the Configuration Control Board
(CCB) for approval. Once the change is approved, funds may be ob-
ligated for production of the change hardware and logistic items.
At this point the LM is responsible for monitoring the logistic
support implementation program which includes the procurement of the
logistic elements by the Logistic Element Managers and installation
kit procurement. After validation and verification, the technical
directive is signed, printed and distributed. Installation of the change
may now commence. Based on the magnitude of the change, the need
for quantitative ILS action ranges from almost none to the assembling
3
of the complete ILS team for a period of years.
C. THE FUNDING
The seeking of dollars to support the change program begins with
the submission of requirements for inclusion in the Congressional budget
two fiscal years in advance of expected use. The LM submits funding
requirements to support changes with calculations based on his
3
The direction for ILS involvement in the change process comes
from NAVMAT INST 4000.20 and NAVAIR 4000. 3 which are not referen-
ced in instructions relating to the TD system.
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expertise, estimates provided by the Naval Air Rework Facility
(NARF) engineers, contractor estimates and inputs from Logistic
Element Managers (LEMs). The LM is concerned with providing
dollars for his program in three specific accounts:
APN-5 Modification money which buys hardware, non-recurring
engineering effort, contractor installation of changes,
and aircraft modification kits.
APN-6 These funds are used to procure spares, repair parts
and kits to modify spares.
OMN Operations and maintenance Navy funds are allocated as
a 'pot' of money to various activities and used for instal-
lation of changes and modification of spares by the NARF
as well as procurement of consumable repair parts.
The requested budget flows up the Navy and DOD budget chain to
Congress and the approved funds come back to the LM via NAVAIR.
While this set of channels has its own impact on the budget, a specific
concern of this thesis is the examination of fund flows after the CCB
approves expenditure of funds on a change. It is at this time that funds
should be firm and traceable through their expenditure channels.
Figure 2 shows a simplified fund flow to a commercial contractor for
APN-5 and APN-6 funds. In the case of OMN funds, a project order
would be issued to the NARF by AIR-4148 after issue of the project
directive by AIR- 1041.
19
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The ILS organization begins in the Navy with the Chief of Naval
Operations where the Deputy CNO for Logistics has the specific respon-
sibility for direction and coordination of Navy ILS efforts. The Chief
of Navy Material (NAVMAT) is responsible for ILS policy promulga-
tion, ILS training and ILS career development programs. As directed
by CNO and NAVMAT, each weapons acquisition project has an Inte-
grated Logistic Support Manager (LM) assigned who carries out his
functions in accordance with NAVMAT INST 4000. 20. The LM or
APML (Assistant Project Manager for Logistics) must have a broad
background in logistic management functions and have a knowledge of
engineering design and development, PPBS (Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System), procurement processes and operational needs.
He in turn directs the entire logistic support program for his weapon
system.
The LM works within one of two different types of organization,
either a hierarchal organization or a matrix organization. Within
NAVAIR most of the LM's are in a matrix organization reporting
directly to AIR 04 and laterally reporting to weapon system project
managers, in the NAVAIR Project Management Office. In the case of
small acquisitions there may be a LM responsible for several different
projects and working for different project offices. This type of organ-
ization permits the project office to draw on a large range of expertise
21

within the NAVAIR organization without having to be concerned about
full time employment of people and equipment in support of a single
weapons system.
A hierarchal organization exists in the cases where a weapon
systems manager has been established in accordance with NAVAIR
INST 5400. 70. This is the case of the LM for the F-4 who works directly
for the F-4 WSM and is at the same level as his key counterpart at the
4
Class Desk. This relationship is shown in figure 3.
While the F-4 Logistic Manager himself is now in a hierarchal
chain of command, he is responsible for overseeing the total support
of the weapon system as it is implemented by numerous separate Navy
commands. His means of program monitoring and control is through
a matrix organization of command representatives known as the Inte-
grated Logistic Support Management Team (ILSMT). The major
participants in this team are the Logistic Element Managers (LEM)
which are the activities responsible for the acquisition of the key sup-
port elements such as publications, spare parts, support equipment and
training. Each LEM provides representation on the F-4 ILSMT. This
representative is responsible to his own command as well as to the LM
for insuring adequate planning control and coordination of his activity's
actions in support of the ILS program. He is expected to insure that
The rationale for better management control and conflict reduction
within the hierarchal organization vs the matrix organization is discussed












































































milestones in the ILSP are met. In addition the LEM must maintain
communications with both the LM and other LEMs and team members
in carrying out his part of the process. Figure 4 shows the F4B-N
conversion ILS team which is composed of 15 members from 14 different
commands and is representative of a typical ILS team.
E. THE AUTHORITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE LOGISTICS MANAGER
The authority, accountability, and responsibility held by the
logistics manager is of prime importance in ILS. His job as the LM
begins during the early stages of system inception and includes such
functions as establishing objectives, organizing ILS functions, and
directing and controlling the program to insure objectives are met.
The job continues until the weapon system is phased out of the Navy
inventory.
The F-4 LM is accountable for his Integrated Logistic Support
Program to the Weapon System Manager and through him to the Com-
mander NAVAIR as outlined in NAVMAT INST 4000. 20 and NAVAIR
INST 5400. 70. These instructions hold him accountable for the out-
come of the ILS effort and assign specific management responsibilities
including inputs in change planning, preparing and defending budgets
on changes, and insuring that all ILS elements are procured and in
place at the proper time.
By way of authority, the LM carries the power of Commander
Naval Air Systems Command in his dealings with other commands.
24

ILS MANAGEMENT TEAM COMPOSITION
CHAIRMAN
F4 Logistic Manager
TEAM MEMBERS F4B-N ILS TEAM
Naval Air Rework Facility, North Island (314)
Air Force Plant Representative Office, St. Louis (PDO)
* Aviation Supply Office (SCW1-1A)
Commandant of the Marine Corps (AAJ)
Commanding General, Fourth Marine Air Wing (15)
Chief of Naval Operations (OP-506C)
Commander Naval Air Forces Atlantic (522B)
Commander Naval Air Forces Pacific (725)
Chief of Naval Reserve (32)
McDonnell Douglas Corporation (D501)
* Naval Air Engineering Center (92A41)
* Naval Aviation Maintenance Training Group (322)
* Naval Air Technical Services Facility (218)
Naval Air Systems Command (53441)
Naval Air Systems Command Representative, Pacific (33411




Specific authority is given to him to organize an ILSMT for any system
or equipment that he deems in need of it. Through the ILSP he has the




III. PROBLEMS OF ILS AND CHANGES
It is the purpose of this chapter to synthesize the results of the
literature search and personnel interviews conducted to show the major
ILS and modification problem areas that were disclosed. These prob-
lem areas fell into three groupings; personnel management, via the
matrix organization; money management; and time problems, all of
which affected or are affected by the authority, accountability, and
responsibility of the LM. Each of these problem areas is discussed in
light of its possible impact on the change process as illustrated in
Chapter II.
A. MANAGEMENT OF THE MATRIX ORGANIZATION BY THE LM
As discussed in Chapter II the weapon system manager must co-
ordinate the efforts of many commands in the ILSMT matrix organization.
The advantage within the Navy is that this type of organization provides
a problem solving channel which can focus on a single weapon system
bringing together the knowledge and experience of a diversity of talent
to solve complex problems. This is an important capability in the
management of present day complex weapon systems. However, the
existence of the matrix organization brings many new management prob-
lems before the LM that are not present in hierarchal organizations.
For example, the hierarchal organization has very specific relationships
27

defined through its organization chart but does not show what relation-
ships must be formed within the organization in order to complete its
work, a problem that the matrix organization endeavors to solve. The
power of the organization is in its hierarchy, but people in the matrix
organization are expected to communicate laterally as well as vertically.
Also, as Kingdon points out in his book on the matrix organization, there
has been no program that teaches people the interpersonal skills neces-
sary for this kind of participation.
The management of an inter-command organization like the ILSMT
is even more complicated by the existence of differing goals, objectives,
and organizations within each command. This forces the LM to have to
deal with conflicting interests and organizational outputs that are often
not consistent with his goals. In his examination of the Harpoon ILS
organization, Brattain noted that it was evident that the ILSMT members
were not focusing on the goals of the program, but rather on the goals
of their own commands. This situation is not unpredictable when it is
recognized that for any individual team member the measure of his
success is the personnel evaluation which is completed by the command
to which he belongs. The ILS team member is serving two or more
masters in the matrix and hierarchal organizations creating the problem




The above conditions are further aggravated when the concept of
management control of work is considered. The establishment of
objectives, priorities, and schedules becomes an almost unsurmount-
able task when the multitude of changes in process at any point in time
is considered. Lack of effective control may mean that actions are
not completed. Individual workers subject to numerous demands for
their time apply themselves to satisfying those individuals placing the
strongest demands on them at any one time.
Even at operating levels of command, the commanders prerogative
to make decisions is recognized and preserved. In the case of modi-
fications the Technical Directive System very specifically states:
"Nothing in this instruction precludes or modifies the operating com-
mander's prerogative to take any action he deems necessary to insure
5
the safe operation of assigned aircraft and aeronautical equipments. "
This authority leaves open the possibility of not installing changes,
installing changes before scheduled dates, and other operating level
decisions that will affect the ability of ILS to provide continued effec-
tive support of the weapon system and its modifications unless it is
actively communicated to the ILS team in a timely fashion.
Another major area wherein the LM and team members will en-
counter problems is the field of communications. The requirements
of ILS in the matrix organization place new communications burdens
5NAVAIR INST 5215. 8A. The NAVAIE. Technical Directive
System, p. 1-2, 14 March 1973.
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on the individual. Now, not only must he communicate vertically but
he must communicate laterally within his own organization and within
the structure of the ILS team with the purpose of resolving problems
that reduce the effectiveness of the ILS program. The individual must
be able to communicate with people of many different backgrounds and
goals. In the case of the LEM it becomes important that all employees
are informed about the "big picture, " where their job fits into it and
how they are expected to support and further the organization goals
through such subsidiary programs as ILS. The failure of communica-
tions can cause incomplete and uncoordinated output, reducing the
effectiveness of ILS programs.
All of these problem areas create conditions for an atmosphere
of conflict as do the separate formal and informal groups existing
within the various commands. Yet, while one of the major functions
of ILS is technical conflict resolution, it may fail to resolve the per-
sonal conflict of individuals involved in the process. The failure to
resolve individual conflict problems can, in the long run, certainly
be expected to result in actions unfavorable to the desired outcome
of ILS programs.
This leads immediately to the topic of individual motivation as a
factor in ILS management. The complexities of the program, the
multitude of changes and the varying demands on an individual's time
can be major factors affecting the motivation of any individual in the
30

organization. The individual ILSMT member must also adjust to the
ILSMT organization and be motivated to operate within its bounds.
This means that the person must become a part of the group. He must
gain some understanding of the jobs of other people in the ILS program
and the impact of his actions on their parts of the program. Above all,
he must learn to value the perspectives of others.
B. FUNDING
One of the key problems identified from both literature examined
and interviews conducted is that of control of funds throughout the
change process. The budget process itself involves a great deal of
risk from the time of budgeting until funds are actually made available
to the LM. However, even then the LM may not have control since
funds are allocated to various LEM's to spend without any requirement
to report expenditures to the LM. The distribution of OMN dollars is
done as a 'pot'of money to various activities. Such funds are not iden-
tified for use on specific changes. Over-spending by the activity on
one project will cause problems on another project with no prediction
as to which projects will be in trouble as a result of a shortage of funds
In contrast to the pot concept for activities within the Navy, con-
tractors are given funds tied to specific contracts with specified
results expected and penalties exacted for failure to meet contractual
requirements. This provides a greater degree of control for the LM,
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but even this system has its loopholes. Contractors have certain
opportunities for fund manipulations that cannot be traced through
the accounting system. As an example, a contractor can install a
compatability change in a production aircraft utilizing existing funds
without approval of NAVAIR or the project manager. Such action
obviously affects immediate funds and other installations that were
planned, as well as the need for future support of the new change
installed by the contractor.
Even after the project manager has been authorized his funds, they
may be reallocated by NAVAIR to satisfy the urgent requirements of
other weapon systems. This reallocation effort can take the form of
an across the board cut in funds which may not permit identification of
programs or changes affected. An example of where 26 million dollars
in OMN funds allocated for rework of F-4 aircraft was used for re-
work of other aircraft illustrates this point. What the 26 million
dollars were actually spent on remains uncertain. Even worse, the
impact of one such action is not assessed in relation to other elements
of the change process that are also in motion. The lack of OMN
dollars at the NARF may preclude installation of a change for a year
or more but funds given to a LEM for supply support, trainers, etc. ,
that were not affected can continue to be spent as if all were well.
Naval Audit Service Western Region. Audit Report Z60046-
Interservice Audit of Material Readiness of Selected Forces, Depart-
ment of the Navy, 15 Oct 1976, p. V-9.
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Such actions result in overexpenditure in some areas and rebudgeting
in other areas of the same program.
This reallocation of funds from one program to another is tech-
nically known as reprogramming and can happen at all levels of com-
mand. While there is overall guidance, rules for reprogramming
funds are not extensive, and the ability to do it is interpreted as flexi-
bility in fund management. At the lowest level the LM may need
additional funds for an unbudgeted requirement or for an already
budgeted one. For small needs he may use his own existing funds.
For larger requirements he must go to NAVAIR. who can use its pre-
rogative to reprogram funds. However, by convention, requirements
ranging from 1 to 5 million must go to CNO. Congress must approve
reprogramming of funds greater than 5 million.
An increasing inventory of uninstalled modification kits and req-
uests for increased installation monies has brought some of these
budgeting and funding problems to the attention of Congress, who is
taking an active interest in devising policies that will reduce the
modification budget and effect better management of modification
programs. On the subject of reprogramming, Congress has decreed
that action will be taken to prevent the need for congressional re-
programming approval. Specific rules as to when reprogramming is
absolutely not permitted were established and are of interest.
33

DOD may not request items previously denied by Congress.
When high priority programs slip, these funds may not be
reprogrammed to lower priority projects.
RDT&E funds may not be reprogrammed to lower priority
projects and then requested again in another FY.
Reprogramming at below 'threshold' dollars several times to
n
get needed dollars at or above threshold is not permitted.
It would thus seem that increased emphasis on management of
these funds is necessitating changes in the way the Navy carries out
its modification programs. Need for such change is also discussed
by the Navy Audit Service pointing out the problem of lack of comparison
of accomplishment of a program to the approved program to determine
how shifts in funds have affected the weapon system. Such a problem
also highlights their comment that there is no uniform basis for compar-
o
ing readiness to funding.
C. TIME
While the problem of time is not specifically addressed as a prob-
lem in the literature search, it was brought out as a factor which
affected modification management by several people interviewed. It
^
7House Committee on Appropriations Report 93-662, 26 Nov 1973.
Q
Naval Audit Service Western Region. Audit Report 260046 Inter-
Service Audit of Material Readiness of Selected Forces, Department of
the Navy, 15 October 1976, pp. II-3 - II-4.
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It usually shows itself in the form of a delay either in actual schedule
or planned schedule and can affect installation rate and costs, funding
available, adequacy of engineering effort, and contractor production
schedules. Early completion of efforts can also cause problems such
as installation of change in aircraft prior to support elements being
available, or delivery of support elements prior to verification and
validation which may cause changes to the elements already delivered.
Funds normally are approved for obligation in only one fiscal year
and any delay in this obligation process may mean the loss of use of
funds in that fiscal year with consequent excess requirements the next
fiscal year. In those situations where funds are alloted to other
activities without specific spending instructions, this problem may
exist but is hidden in the total expenditure of the funds.
The number of changes and the many actions required to implement
each one begin to take their toll on the time available to manage them
as there is also competition for this time from major ongoing pro-
grams of which changes have been historically considered only a minor
part. As a result, supporting activities are currently seeking ways to
improve change management by such means as mechanizing change
information and reducing paper work flow time between contractor
and LEM's in procurement actions.
35

D. AUTHORITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, PROBLEM
AREAS
The problems discussed above indicate that there are areas where
the logistic manager does not have full control over all elements of
the change process. This was also discussed by Price and Deal who
concluded that the most significant result of their study was the evi-
9
dence of the need for more authority for the LM. The Naval Audit
Service investigation of the F-4 noted this problem also and stated
that there was a widespread decoupling of accountability, responsibility
and authority.
The area of budgeting, funding and expenditure of funds obviously
has an impact on LM's ability to manage and control the ultimate out-
come of ILS on the various changes. Lack of control of expenditure of
monies once distributed may prevent the LM from predicting the ILS
outcome, may increase the uncertainty factor in his planning and may
not give him one of the tools needed to insure responsiveness of his
element managers. Any action by higher authority to reprogram funds
at an activity may affect the logistic support for a change but the LM
would not be aware of it, nor of its impact until some specific delay
is incurred at a later date.
^Price, R.B., III, and Deal, G.W., An Analysis of the Role of
the Deputy Program Manager for Logistics as viewed by various
participants in the system acquisition process . Thesis. Air Force
Institute of Technology, March 1973.
Naval Audit Service Western Region. Audit Report Z60046,
15 Oct 76, p. II-2.
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The LM has problems because of the matrix type organization in
that he exercises no direct control over his ILSMT members. He does
not select team members or the area of a command from which they
come. In addition he has no direct input to ILSMT member fitness
reports or personnel evaluations. The LM can call ILSMT meetings,
but there is no directive that says members must attend the meetings.
Discussion with the F-4 and S-3 ILS managers have indicated that
to combat this situation, the LM must have skills and abilities that
allow him to communicate with and manage a diverse group of people
on a purely person to person basis. He must be able to motivate,
stimulate and persuade personnel in the matrix organization in order
to accomplish the goals of the ILS program for his weapon system.
The time factor affects the LM's ability to make decisions and
act quickly if he does not have the tools to cause things to happen.
Decisions by higher authority, changing operational requirements
and changing world situation all give rise to the need for action that
the LM may not be able to accomplish if the needed authority, account-
ability, and responsibility are not centralized in his position.
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IV. DATA SEARCH AND ANALYSIS
A. DATA COLLECTION
As discussed in Chapter I, data collected consisted of cost, timing
and installation information taken from Engineering Change Proposal
(ECP) files maintained by the F-4 Logistic Support Manager and his staff
at the Naval Air Rework Facility, North Island, California. After an
unsuccessful attempt to obtain adequate data from files selected on a
random basis, it was found that files having activity subsequent to 1973
were relatively complete and contained the type of information needed
for this study. Thus further selection of files for study was made by
selecting those that had adequate information.
The final assemblage of data consisted of information from fourteen
changes that affected one or more models of the F-4 aircraft or of its
engine, the J79. Four of these changes were among those in the original
randomly selected group. These are North Island (NI) ECP-226, NI ECP-
316, McDonnell-Douglas Corporation (MDC) ECP-864 and MDC ECP-971.
Based on official correspondence in the change files and interviews with
the Logistic Manager's staff about these specific changes a short com-
mentary was compiled about each change.
B. DATA PRESENTATION
Since only 14 changes out of the approximately 1000 changes on
file were examined, a presentation of data from each change is made.
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This listing of changes is followed by a chart summarizing major points
taken from data on each change. The section is concluded with a discus-
sion of data collected on Integrated Logistic Support Management Teams
and funding.
The change summaries that follow are presented in the following
format:
CHANGE: ECP designation and AFC/AVC number
APPROVED: Date first approved by CCB.
MEA: Whether or not a Maintenance Engineering Analysis was
conducted based on CCB information and interview comments.
PROBLEM INDICATORS: Selected data from the change which
indicates variance from desired or planned outcome of the
change effort.
COMMENTS: Non- quantitative information about the change.
Change Summaries
1. CHANGE: GE ECP-79H50 PPC-151 Approved 12/71
MEA: No.
PROBLEM INDICATORS
Installation delay: 3 months from planned start of
Oct 72 until Jan 73.
Kit cost differential: Authorized $24. 00 per kit
Contract price $2 0. 22
Available 3.78




COMMENTS: Data in file limited. Procurement of kits initiated
5/72 with 36 week delivery which is major contributing factor
to delay. MEA would not help.
2. CHANGE: NIECP-180 AFC-510 Approved 5/72
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS
Installation delay: 51 months from planned start of Sept 72
until ? 77.




Adapter kit $ 467 $2900 520%
Basic kit 5608 7835 40%
COMMENTS: This change is a retrofit for F4J aircraft that did
not have it as a part of production. Install kits were procured
from British who decided not to install them. Major problem
was price underestimation as a result of over aged items in
basic kits, plus additional material required for adaptation
to USN aircraft. MEA would not have been of significant
assistance in this change.
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3. CHANGE: NI ECP-226 AVC-478 REV A Approved 7/73
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS
Installation Delay: 30 months from planned start Oct 73
until Apr 76
COMMENTS: Change was prepared as a result of interface prob-
lem between AVC-478 and later AVC-862. Neither AVC-478
nor AVC-862 had MEA. Had AVC 862 had a MEA it is pos-
sible that there would have been no need for AVC-478 REV. A,
4. CHANGE: NI ECP-291 AFC-568 Approved 6/73
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS:
Installation delay: 10 months from planned start date of
Sept 73 until July 74.
Lead time planning: ECP approved 6-73
Support date 9-73
Actual kit delivery 5-74
Reprogrammed Funds: CNO Message 221934Z Jun "73




AC FT OS IP FUNDS
A-6 35-72 $115 K
F-4 38-70 475 K
A-7 57-70 310 K
CH 46 4-73 500 K
TOTAL $1, 400 K.
OMN Funds currently at NARF to be used for installs
For Actual Dollars
CCB Date Approved Installs FY Installs Unused
731-745 6/73 3,144,900 700 74 - $3,144,900
COMMENTS: This emergency requirement for wingfold locklug
replacement affected every F4 aircraft. Availability of
complete wing panels from Air Force helped resolve this
problem. MEA would have helped even if late and should
have been able to disclose inter changeability, tooling and
spares inventory alternatives which caused delays and prob.
lems in managing this change.
5. CHANGE: NIECP-316 AFC-578 Approved 3/74
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS:
Installation delay: 8 months delay from planned start of
Sep 74 until May 75
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COMMENTS: Change originated to resolve compatability prob-
lems between F4N aircraft and AVC-1357. MEA would not
help this change, however need for the change could have been
eliminated had adequate MEA been conducted on AVC-1357.
6. CHANGE: NI ECP-325 AFC-576 Approved 2/74
MEA: No. Maintenance plan dated 8 Oct 74.
PROBLEM INDICATORS
Installation delay: 6 months from planned start of
Feb 75 until Jul 75.
OMN Install funds used:
For Actual Dollars
CCB Date Approved Installs FY Installs Unused
741-442 2/74 94, 000 24 75 1 90, 083
741-442S1 10/75 90, 000 20 76 35 (67, 500
NET UNUSED 22, 500
Price of installation escalated from $3917 per aircraft to
$4500 per aircraft. Planned installation cost for FY 77 is
$5339 per aircraft.
ILSMT action items. Jul. 75: I-Level PGSE still requires
maintenance plans. I-Level test set still in design
Tech manual validation started 26 June 1975.
COMMENTS: This change is part of a series of AWG-10A radar
implementing changes. The Maintenance Plan was for
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Westinghouse ECP-152 (AVC-1590). However even the late
plan was the result of inadequate engineering as subsequent
problems showed impact on publications and support equip-
ment much more extensive than anticipated from available data.
7. CHANGE: NI ECP-350 AVC-585 Approved 8/74
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS:
Installation Delay: 14+ months from planned start of
Nov 75 until present.
OMN Install Funds Unused
For Actual Dollars
Date Approved Installs FY Installs Unused
8/74 101,790 65 76 1 100,224
11/75 137,025 75 77 - 137, 025
NET UNUSED 237,249
Increase in installation costs from $18 per hour to $21
per hour (1974-1975), 17%. Increase in kit cost from
$4412.80 to $7012.50; 59%.
COMMENTS: Two major problems with this change; lack of
install money at NI and inability to obtain Government
Furnished Equipment. Change installs ARC- 159 radio in
F4 aircraft. Vendor for radio itself has experienced delay
in production, and output is going to F-14 and other aircraft
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before being supplied to F-4. Since this is a common system
to many aircraft, MEA would not have improved situation.
8. CHANGE: MDC-ECP-864 AFC-433 Approved: 5/68
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS
Installation Delay: 6 months from planned start of Jun 69
until Dec 69
MEARS at cost of $10K deleted from approved ECP.
COMMENTS: This ECP changed the intercom system in F4J
Aircraft. MEA might have helped. Inadequate data for
good analysis
.
9. CHANGE: MDC ECP-952 AFC-555 Approved 9/69
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS
Installation delay: 12 months from planned start May 74
until May 75
OMN Install funds used
For Actual Dollars
CCB Date Approved Installs FY Installs Unused
721-727R2 11/73 2,543,632 70 75 18 1,889,555
76 35 (1,271,816)




Install price escalation from $36338 per acft to $54288
Kit cost savings
Date Budget Actual Savings Avail
5/26/72 2,640,000 2,475,000 165,000
6/19/75 1,500,000 862,500 637,500
Net 802,500
Vendor qualification tests one year after ECP approval
identified additional engineering and publications effort
costing $24, 000.
COMMENTS: In addition to other problems, training personnel
identified need for trainer equipment. Had MEA been done,
it should have identified these problem areas in the ECP
planning stages.
10. CHANGE: MDC-ECP-971 AFC-500 Approved: 12/69
MEA: Yes. Inadequate
PROBLEM INDICATORS
Installation Delay: 12 months from planned start date of
Dec 71 until Dec 72. Installed as part of F4B-N conversion.
MEARS not procured per MDC ltr of 22 Sep 70.
Support date of 12/72 not met by spares which were
delivered 7/73, 8 months late.
VTAS Problem review meetings held to resolve many prob-
lems arising in Publications, Training, Support equipment.
Meetings similar to but were not ILS meetings.
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COMMENTS: Preliminary Maintenance Analysis Records and
Level of Repair Analysis (21 Jul 72) are dated one year after
first aircraft in fleet. The many problems indicate that
analysis was inadequate.
11. CHANGE: MDC ECP- 1014R1S1 1 AFC-561 Approved: 12/72
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS:
Installation Delay 12+ months from planned start date of
July 74 until Jul 75.
Kit overbudgeting available for possible recapture.
CCB Date Budget Actual Cost Available
731-326 12/72 1,163,600 1,131,881 31,718
731-326R2 12/73 1,087,447 933,178 154,269
731-326R2 12/73 404,186 347,212 56,974
731-326R3 7/74 570,000 557,430 12, 570
Total Available $255,531
APN-5 Spares Modification Kit overrun on kits required
per NavAir Itr of 25 Jan 74 vs actual cost on contract
30 Apr 74
Qty Budget Actual Qty Actual Cost Overrun
120 94260 120 135,646 41,386




CCB Date Approved Installs FY Installs Unused
731,326 12/72 3,139,000 121 74 - 3,139,000
731;326R2 7/74 600,000 30 76 4 520, 000
Net Unused 3, 659, 000
COMMENTS: Change consists of changing structural components
of the aircraft that are subject to fatigue after prolonged air-
craft use. MEA would not be necessary for this change.
12. CHANGE: MDC ECP-4021 AFC-577 Approved 9/73
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS:
Installation delay: 27+ months from planned start of
Jan 75 until April 77
OMN install funds unused
CCB Date Approved Installs Fy Installs Unused
741-510 8/73 150, 000 5 75 - 150, 000
741-510S1 11/74 481, 000 10 76 - 481, 000




Install price escalation from $30, 000 per acft to $48, 100
per acft then to $49, 675 per acft.
Kit delivery delay of 12 months from planned delivery of
Dec 74 until Jan 76.
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COMMENTS: Installation delays caused by procurement delivery
delay, lack of installation money at NI and lack of key piece
of support equipment. MEA would have identified need for
support equipment.
13. CHANGE: PPC-161 Approved 11/74
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS:
Installation delay: 12+ months from planned date of Jan 76
until ? 77
OMN Install funds unused
For Actual Dollars
CCB Date Approved Installs FY Installs Unused
752-113 11/74 173,938 576 76 - 173,938
COMMENTS: Due to delay in incorporation schedule action on
kit procurements suspended in Nov 76. MEA should have found
error in GE drawing and identified fact that intermediate level
could not install change as planned.
14. CHANGE: PPC-157 Approved 2/74
MEA: No
PROBLEM INDICATORS:




Fund Reprogramming. This safety change has budget of
$344, 178 which required reprogramming of existing funds.
Impact and source of funds unknown.
COMMENTS: In Aug 1976 installation of kit in engines waived
until kits become available. MEA would not help since basic
problem was installation rate higher than planned.
Summarization Chart
The following chart summarizes key points from all fourteen
changes examined. A description of columnar headings and data
calculations is provided below.
Change - Changes are listed by ECP number in same order as
change summaries in Section Bl.
Support affected - McDonnell Douglas Report No. P.S. 408,
USN F-4 Composite ILS ECP Status, was primary source
for this information while some data was collected from
change files.
MEA - Whether or not a MEA was conducted as indicated from
change files and interviews with LM personnel.
Delay - Based on comparison of installation commencement as
shown on first ECP Milestone Chart (NAVAIR FORM 13051/5)
with approximate time of first actual installations commencing
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Net OMN $ Unused - As an indication of variance from the
change planned installation rate, this figure is the net of
the planned OMN fund usage from CCB Change Request
(NAVAIR FORM 13050/2) and the author's estimation of
costs (based on a per unit basis) that would be incurred
as the change was actually installed each fiscal year (cost
estimate found by dividing budget by number of planned
installs). Actual cost information was not available in the
LM's files.
Price Escalation - Another indicator of variance and impact of
delay. Percentages are calculated from change in installation
price and kit price changes during delay of installation.
Kit over/under budget - Figure taken from comparison of dollars
approved on CCB Change Request Form and final contract
price where contracts were available for examination.
Objective is to show impact of budgeting for ILS elements.
MEA as key to Problem Presentation - After changes were
reviewed LM personnel were asked if a complete MEA were
done could it have reasonably expected to resolve the problem
encountered in implementation of the change. Results sum-
marized as Yes or No answer. (Refer to comments on each
individual change for additional data)
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Basic problem - Comment concerning what LM personnel believe
to be the underlying cause to the problems experienced during
change implementation
Integrated Logistic Support Management Teams
Due to the continued importance of the F-4 to the Navy as a first
line fighter aircraft, management efforts to keep the aircraft up to
date have resulted in several service life extension programs and the
implementation of many major changes to the various models of the F-4.
To monitor these programs the LM has established five Integrated
Logistic Management Support Teams: The F-4J to S ILSMT, AWG-10A
ILSMT, F-4 B to N ILSMT, Project Sure (Sensor Update and Refurbish-
ment Effort - RF4B) ILSMT and J79 (ENGINE) ILSMT.
A review of membership on the various teams showed that the
four aircraft teams were composed of essentially the same personnel
and that meetings for each ILSMT were held semiannually or more
often in some cases. The membership on the J-79 engine ILSMT,
while representing all ILS elements, was composed of different
personnel than the other teams which reflects the separate manage-
ment of engines within the Navy. Attendance at the ILS meetings for
the F4B-N ILSMT was charted from 1973 to 1976 (6 meetings).














Funding records examined were limited to funds approved by the
CCB and some contracts which were on file in the LM office. The LM
did not keep records of funds budgeted for comparison with funds ex-
pended in the case of APN-6 and OMN dollars. At the time of data
collection, the LM was implementing a system to maintain this informa-
tion for APN-5 funds.
It was determined that the LM responsibility for the funds affecting
his weapon system in terms of budgeting, defending before budget com-
mittees and finally spending the dollars was different for each of the











Spend Yes No No
APN-6 dollars are spent by various logistic element managers and




The key to the overall condition of the F-4 changes is the Data
Summarization Chart which displays several areas of variance from
expected change outcome. Every change examined was delayed from
three to fifty-one months before installation with an average delay of
fifteen months for the fourteen changes. Another variance can be seen
where OMN funds are not utilized as planned due to delays from planned
start of change installation and delays in the aircraft rework induction
schedule. Price escalation factors are noticeably large on some of
the delayed changes.
Probably the most significant fact observed from the data is the
lack of a MEA on all but one change. F-4 LM personnel have stated
that early engineering analysis conducted when originating the ECP
(see figure 1, Chapter II) is only the minimum necessary to document
the change. The adverse impact of this policy is evident when it is
noted that an adequate MEA should have located the problems in 9 of
the 14 changes examined. This seems even more significant when con-
trasted to a new weapon system acquisition process where the MEA and
Logistic Support Analysis become key factors in decisions on costs
and production.
Further evidence of the importance of the MEA is exemplified by
ECP's 226 and 316 which could both have been eliminated had a MEA
been done on a previous change. Other changes evidence problems of
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such things as the change being more complex than early engineering
indicated; new support equipment need was not identified by early
engineering; trainers were not planned for; installation equipment
needs were not forseen.
The funding situation has a specific impact on the engineering
effort and MEA. At the beginning of the change process when the
ECP is originated, budgeting is just beginning and funds are not
available to pay for in depth engineering analysis. The decisions made
in this early engineering effort seem to be accepted as final, and
further analysis may not be purchased when money does become
available.
Once funds are budgeted, the problem of fund control becomes
evident. From the information collected it is seen that the LM budgets
for all funds needed but must defend his budget for only two of the
three funds and he may anticipate spending money for but one of the
funds.
The problems in OMN expenditure are shown on the Data Summary
Chart and further delineated in Figure 5 showing what might happen
to the OMN pot based on change installation and non-installation of a
few of the changes where data were available for estimation of use of
planned OMN dollars. Actual dollars used were not available at the
LM office. In this example funds from three fiscal years would have
gone unobligated, been used for other F-4 change installations, or
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OMN DOLLARS NOT USED IN YEAR PROGRAMMED
CHANGE FY: 74 75_ 76 77
ECP 291 3.144.900 1
ECP 325 -- 90, 083
ECP 350 -- 100,224 137,025
ECP 952 __ 1,889,555 434,304
ECP 1014R1S11 3,139,000 -- 520,000
ECP 4021 150,000 481,000 198,700
PPC 161 173, 938
(1) TOTALS 3,139,000 2,129,638 1,275,162 770,029
OMN DOLLARS USED IN YEAR OTHER THAN PROGRAMMED
(AT ESCALATED RATES) 2
CHANGE FY: 74 75 76 77
ECP291 -- 1,536,606 3 1,563,564
4
ECP 325 67, 500 48, 051
ECP 952 1, 271, 816
(2) TOTALS -- 1,536,606 2,902,880 48,051




Notes - Figure 5
1. No change installed thus no impact on these unprogrammed funds
Had installations been installed funds needed would have come
from existing funds for other changes.
2. Assumes changes uninstalled from previous years must be done
at rates programmed for FY in question.
3. Assumes change installed at rate of 57 per month starting Jul 74
utilizing existing funds.
4. Assumes 8 remaining kits will be installed at FY 77 rate of
$5339 per aircraft.

used to support other aircraft. In fiscal year 76 the over-obligation
of funds would take money planned for other aspects of the F-4 or money
programmed for another aircraft type. This kind of situation existed in
the case of ECP-350 and ECP-4021 where OMN installation funds had
been approved but at installation time funds were not available at NI to do
the work thus causing a delay in the change installation.
At the LM level there is no provision for record keeping on the
various funds. It was found that none were maintained until recently
when a local record of APN-5 budget vs obligations was established.
Without such records unused funds revert to NAVAIR for use as that com-
mand sees fit. Without some kind of feedback on APN-6 and OMN dollar
expenditures the logistic manager's budgeting will contain inaccuracies
because of the uncertainty as to what actual costs have been in the past.
As noted in Chapter II, the personnel impact on ILS can be significant,
with the key to personnel management being communications. One com-
parison of interest made was attendance at F4B-N ILS meetings by key
LEM's vs support affected in the various changes examined (from Data




















This comparison is in no way conclusive but it does serve to indicate
that lack of attendance at ILS meetings may place an additional burden




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The data collected in the process of this study indicate the exist-
ence of several areas of deficiency, creating conditions that may have
an adverse affect on the outcome of the change process. The con-
clusions listed below point out these specific areas. It is recognized
that conclusions must be tempered by the fact that time and dollars
available only permitted gathering minimal data. However, similar
conclusions arrived at by the Naval Audit Service Report (Z60046)
through a different means of analysis serve to give credence to the
conclusions of this thesis.
As the result of this study and data analysis the following con-
clusions have been arrived at subject to the qualification that additional
data needs to be gathered for statistically significant results.
The change process itself is not supportive of logistical
needs.
Failure to conduct maintenance engineering analysis on
specific changes has been responsible for unsatisfactory
outcome of the change process.
Lack of a comprehensive funding policy for the F-4 weapon
system has affected weapon system manager's ability to control
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expenditures for the F-4, to account for monies assigned to
the F-4 weapon system and to assess the impact of changes
of funding on the F-4 program.
Inadequate personnel management and training in the areas of
personal interrelationships has fostered communications
problems, conflict situations, and personnel insecurity which
may have contributed to difficulties in the change process.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the data and conclusions presented, several recommenda-
tions are offered as specifics for future study and possible solutions to
problems identified.
Required MEA at time ECP is originated. Further study of a
cost/benefit analysis might compare benefit (cost) of MEA as
opposed to cost of delays in terms of funds lost, price escala-
tion, etc.
Establishing a weapon system funding policy which will provide
the weapon system manager and logistic manager with control
of funds throughout the entire change process. Future study
of such a concept could endeavor to determine whether actual
fund expenditures at various logistic activities were equal to




Restructuring of the change process itself to include MEA at
ECP origination, bringing the LM to the same level of review
as class desk engineer and establishing check points in the
process whereby logistical procurements can be started,
stopped, slowed or otherwise managed to better control use
of funds and improve the outcome of the change itself.
Further study into the personnel management and training
of people involved in the ILS process to facilitate development
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